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ABSTRACT. Biodiversity loss is one of the most significant drivers of ecosystem change and is projected to continue at a rapid rate.
While protected areas, such as national parks, are seen as important refuges for biodiversity, their effectiveness in stemming biodiversity
decline has been questioned. Public agencies have a critical role in the governance of many such areas, but there are tensions between
the need for these agencies to be more “adaptive” and their current operating environment. Our aim is to analyze how institutions
enable or constrain capacity to conserve biodiversity in a globally significant cross-border network of protected areas, the Australian
Alps. Using a novel conceptual framework for diagnosing biodiversity institutions, our research examined institutional adaptive capacity
and more general capacity for conserving biodiversity. Several intertwined issues limit public agencies’ capacity to fulfill their
conservation responsibilities. Narrowly defined accountability measures constrain adaptive capacity and divert attention away from
addressing key biodiversity outcomes. Implications for learning were also evident, with protected area agencies demonstrating successful
learning for on-ground issues but less success in applying this learning to deeper policy change. Poor capacity to buffer political and
community influences in managing significant cross-border drivers of biodiversity decline signals poor fit with the institutional context
and has implications for functional fit. While cooperative federalism provides potential benefits for buffering through diversity, it also
means protected area agencies have restricted authority to address cross-border threats. Restrictions on staff  authority and discretion,
as public servants, have further implications for deploying capacity. This analysis, particularly the possibility of fostering “ambidexterity”
—creatively responding to political pressures in a way that also achieves a desirable outcome for biodiversity conservation—is one
promising way of building capacity to buffer both political influences and ecological pressures. The findings and the supporting analysis
provide insight into how institutional capacity to conserve biodiversity can be enhanced in protected areas in Australia and elsewhere,
especially those governed by public agencies and/or multiple organizations and across jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Globally, biodiversity loss ranks as one of the most significant
drivers of ecosystem change (Hooper et al. 2012), but the pace of
decline shows no signs of slowing as pressures on ecosystems
increase (Butchart et al. 2010). Land use change, invasive species,
and climate change are among the most significant drivers of
biodiversity loss (Sala et al. 2000). Addressing these threats
requires better coordination of conservation across landscapes
(Likens and Lindenmayer 2012, Wyborn 2015). In this context,
large, well-designed and managed protected areas can play an
important role in meeting conservation targets and can help slow
the rate of biodiversity loss (Butchart et al. 2012). Protected areas
are places that are recognized, dedicated, and managed to achieve
long-term conservation (Dudley 2008), but the effectiveness of
these areas in conserving biodiversity has been widely debated.
While many factors have been blamed for the continued loss of
biodiversity despite expansion of protected areas, part of the
critique centers on how poor governance has undermined social
and ecological outcomes (Mora and Sale 2011, Le Saout et al.
2013, Dudley et al. 2014, Hill et al. 2015).  
Institutions are the rules and norms that structure, stabilize, and
provide meaning to social life (Scott 2014). They provide
constraints and opportunities, thereby influencing the behavior
of individuals and organizations and determining subsequent
consequences of that behavior (McGinnis 2011). Institutions also
support the capacity of actors to adapt to environmental change
and are capable of influencing the trajectory of social-ecological
systems (SESs) (Chaffin et al. 2014). Understanding institutions
and governance can thus help identify critical points of
intervention and support improved decision-making and better
biodiversity outcomes in protected areas.  
Our aim is to analyze how institutional conditions enable or
constrain the capacity to conserve biodiversity in a cross-border
protected area network in the Australian Alps (the Alps). The
focus is on public agencies because although governance of
protected areas increasingly involves nonstate actors, government
agencies still play a major role in governing these areas on their
own and as partners. In many areas, including the Australian Alps,
public agencies have high levels of responsibility for solving public
problems, which makes them a critical part of the solution (Ansell
2011). The Australian Alps provides an ideal case study location
to examine government-managed protected areas, as well as
landscape-scale cooperation, because the network of
internationally significant protected areas covers three
subnational jurisdictions.  
In complex SESs and under conditions of rapid environmental
change, many researchers have highlighted the need for adaptive
capacity. Adaptive capacity of institutions is defined as the
“characteristics of institutions that empower social actors to
respond to short and long-term impacts either through planned
measures or through allowing and encouraging creative responses
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from society” (Gupta et al. 2010:461). These institutional
characteristics are essential for effective conservation, but
adaptive capacity is insufficient if  foundational knowledge and
skills (i.e., general capacity) are missing. General capacity is the
ability to identify and solve problems and deploy knowledge and
skills (Virji et al. 2012). We focus on both types of capacity.  
The inherent uncertainty, complexity, and nonlinear dynamics of
SESs are challenging for traditional, centralized, efficiency-driven
approaches (Chaffin et al. 2014) that can characterize protected
area management agencies. Adaptive governance has been
proposed as an alternative to current arrangements, under the
premise that it emphasizes a more experimental, learning-driven
approach (Brunner 2010, Chaffin et al. 2014). Ideally, adaptive
governance consists of multilayered governance networks
fostering learning, building social capital, and linking across
vertical and horizontal scales; polycentricity; and deliberative
decision-making (Dietz et al. 2003, Folke et al. 2005, Armitage et
al. 2012). Implementation of adaptive governance in practice
remains slow, however, and advancing it requires an
understanding of institutions and the social, political, and other
factors that influence institutional adaptive capacity (Koontz et
al. 2015).  
There is a critical need to examine the practicality of calls to be
more “adaptive” given the administrative limits of key actors,
especially government agencies (Eakin et al. 2011, Rijke et al.
2012, Wyborn and Dovers 2014). This operating environment
includes tight budgets and timescales, limiting political and
statutory mandates, inflexible accountability measures, and rigid
administrative control due to low levels of public trust (Ansell
2011, Wyborn and Dovers 2014). What is poorly understood—
and examined in this study—is how the operating environments
of public agencies reinforce or undermine adaptive capacity. The
examination draws on both adaptive and general capacity to
provide insights. A particular interest is how the operating
environments of public agencies can enable or constrain capacity,
thereby creating poor institutional fit.
METHODS
We adopted an institutional diagnostic method. The focus here
is on diagnosing the aspects of biodiversity conservation that are
salient for problem-solving by asking a series of questions to
determine the sources of institutional problems in order to
recommend appropriate solutions, guided by the methodology
developed by Young (2008). A diagnosis investigates whether
institutions have the capacity to deal with environmental
problems using the concept of institutional fit. Based on the
principle that institutional dimensions should be tailored to the
requirements of environmental problems (Young 2008), fit
considers whether institutions match the spatial, temporal, and
functional aspects of the ecosystems governed (Boyd and Folke
2011). Poor functional fit, for example, is where institutions fail
to respond adequately to drivers that could have been buffered,
fail to buffer between socioeconomic and biophysical systems, or
deploy responses that are mistimed, misdirected, or nonexistent
(Galaz et al. 2008). The concept of fit is used more broadly here
than in the adaptive governance literature, considering political
fit; i.e., whether institutions are adapted to their socio-political
environment (Goodin 1996).
Conceptual framework
A novel conceptual framework (Clement et al. 2016) guided
diagnosis. The framework has four categories of focus: problems
and players, politics, competence, and capacity (Fig. 1, segments
of the circle). These categories subdivide into elements (Fig. 1,
boxed words). The framework was designed specifically to analyze
biodiversity institutions. Although the concepts of general and
adaptive capacity align closely with the competence and capacity
categories, elements in the other two categories can exert a strong
influence on capacity (Fig. 1, arrows), as the diagnosis we use
illustrates. The framework draws on adaptive governance,
including the concepts of buffering and self-organizing, as well
as the institutional literature, especially organizational studies
and public administration. This broad approach ensures the
diagnostic attends to more general capacity issues (e.g.,
administrative competence) and the wider institutional context
(e.g., framing, interplay) in which organizations responsible for
conserving biodiversity operate.
Fig. 1. Diagram of conceptual framework used in this
diagnosis.
Adaptive governance concepts in the framework were
complemented with ideas from the institutional literature to
ensure diagnosis considered the conflicting demands for
organizations to be more “adaptive” along with their
administrative limits. For example, key actors in biodiversity
governance often have low levels of discretion and high levels of
responsibility (Eakin et al. 2011, Rijke et al. 2012, Wyborn and
Dovers 2014). Together, the elements consider the institutional
context and capacity for conserving biodiversity. The framework
thus leverages the potential of adaptive governance to improve
capacity and institutional fitness for conserving biodiversity,
while acknowledging the practical limits of actors operating in
governmental environments.  
Insights from the institutional literature and particularly
organizational studies and public administration were
fundamental to the design of the framework. For example,
buffering in adaptive governance refers to the ability to cope with
uncertainty and surprises, and provides backup if  one part of the
system fails (Boyd and Folke 2011). To enhance this concept for
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use in our framework, the institutional literature on interplay
(Oberthür and Gehring 2011, Vatn and Vedeld 2012) and
organizational buffering (O’Toole and Meier 2011) was
incorporated. In addition to examining institutional responses to
biophysical conditions, these documents attend to a diverse suite
of causes of institutional interactions. They also highlight how
external pressures in institutional environments limit the
effectiveness of conservation approaches, and provide strategies
for managing these interactions and pressures. Using literature
on public administration ensured that fundamental conditions,
such as administrative competence, were considered in addition
to the more dynamic practices emphasized in adaptive
governance.
Interviews and analysis
The conceptual framework was used to design a set of interview
questions that were asked of 51 respondents through
semistructured, indepth interviews. The sampling logic was
purposive: interviewees who were selected played a role in solving
the policy problems associated with landscape-scale biodiversity
conservation in the Australian Alps (Table 1). Most government
respondents were from middle management, given their critical
bridging position between planning and operations (Ansell 2011),
although a few were in senior management or played more on-
ground roles. An initial list of interviewees was identified through
a key informant who had specialist knowledge of biodiversity
governance in the Alps, and some were identified through
snowball sampling (Atkinson and Flint 2003).  
The conceptual framework provided a lens for qualitative analysis
of the interview transcripts. A coding process was first guided by
a set of a priori codes from the framework (Creswell 2013),
followed by a second level of analysis where emergent themes were
identified from coding patterns (Miles and Huberman 1994). The
framework elements provided the concepts for analysis across
interviews in this second level of analysis (Miles and Huberman
1994), where the data were synthesized into themes. Intercoder
reliability was 85%.
Table 1. Individuals interviewed in each category.
 
Category Number of
respondents
State government (Parks Victoria, NSW NPWS,† ACT‡ 
Parks, Department of Environment and Primary
Industries Victoria)
27
Researchers and consultants 9
Federal government (Department of Environment, Parks
Australia)
7
Environmental NGOs and NRM groups§ 4
Local government 2
Tourism representatives 2
TOTAL 51
† NSW NPWS: New South Wales National Parks and Wildlife Service
‡ ACT: Australian Capital Territory
§ NGO: nongovernment organization; NRM: Natural Resource
Management Group
RESULTS
All elements of the framework contributed to the suite of
questions asked in interviews; however, it was evident after
analyzing the interview transcripts that some elements were
particularly relevant to the aim of this paper—that is, how
institutional conditions enable or constrain the capacity to
conserve biodiversity. Most relevant were the themes of
administrative competence, learning, buffering, and power and
authority (all elements in Fig. 1). Table 2 provides definitions of
these critical elements. While other framework elements, such as
culture and norms and interplay were important, their results were
of less relevance to capacity than those explored below. To
illustrate the specific challenges of cross-border conservation, fire
and feral horse management are used as examples. Although
many other issues were raised in the interviews, these two were
most prominent and among the most significant influences on
biodiversity in this SES (Lockwood et al. 2014).
The Australian Alps and the institutional context
The Australian Alps is a mountainous region comprised mainly
of protected areas in southeastern Australia (Fig. 2), and includes
portions of Victoria, New South Wales (NSW), and the
Australian Capital Territory (ACT). This bioregion is reserved
mainly as national park. Listed as a national heritage place under
federal biodiversity legislation, the Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act), the Alps
are unique in this relatively flat continent and are recognized
internationally by the IUCN as a world center for plant diversity
(Davis et al. 1994).  
Although ecologically the alpine and subalpine landscapes are
similar across borders, the involvement of multiple agencies
affects the unity of their management. Australia has a cooperative
federalist form of government with a limited set of powers
reserved for the national government (Bates 2010).
Environmental responsibilities, including land management, lie
with state jurisdictions, even for “national” parks. The main
institutions with a role in conservation are the state and territory
management agencies: Parks Victoria, the NSW National Parks
and Wildlife Service (NPWS), and ACT Territory and Municipal
Services.  
To address the challenge of managing the Alps across these
jurisdictional boundaries, the Australian Alps Cooperative
Program (AACP) was formally established under a Memorandum
of Understand (MOU) in 1986. Partners in the program are the
protected area management agencies in all three jurisdictions plus
the federal government, which also retains a statutory role
through its responsibility for Matters of National Environmental
Significance under the EPBC Act, which include threatened
species, ecological communities, and National Heritage Places
such as the Alps. Despite operating under an MOU, the AACP
has survived many political cycles and contentious management
issues. It has been presented as an example of an innovative and
effective regional management institution (Crabb and Dovers
2007, Jacobs and Anderson 2012, Weiler et al. 2012). While peer
support, on-ground cooperation, and learning have been
highlighted as key strengths of the program, the AACP has
struggled to deal effectively with cross-border issues such as
climate change and feral horse management (Crabb and Dovers
2007).  
Despite secure tenure as protected areas, the alpine and subalpine
ecosystems are facing potential transformation in the face of
significant threatening processes, such as climate change, grazing
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Table 2. Summary of framework components salient to this analysis.
 
Component
Definition Why it matters in this diagnosis
Administrative competence
The basic financial and human resources and institutional strategies
necessary to competently and effectively manage biodiversity.1 
Includes the ability of public agencies to competently solve problems
and fulfill their mission, as well as the scientific skills and knowledge
of their staff.2
Critical to analyzing general capacity for conservation, and
considering how this interfaces with the broader institutional context
and calls to be more adaptive.3
Understanding how the administrative limits of public agencies affect
their ability to deploy their capacity can help inform more realistic but
readily achievable forms of adaptive governance.4
Learning
Learning at its most basic level provides for routine correction and
quality control.5 Learning that supports adaptive capacity includes
practices for gathering information, systematic reflection on
performance and processes, revising underlying assumptions, and
creatively improvising solutions and adopting a systems approach.6
Analyzing learning routines sheds light on the institutional issues
constraining adaptive management7 and can inform institutional
reforms or strategies for coping with those constraints.
Understanding the successes and failures in efforts to enhance learning
can help identify pragmatic pathways for building general capacity to
learn and solve problems.1,2
Buffering
Buffering refers to the ability to cope with uncertainty and surprises,
and provides backup if  one part of the system fails. Redundancy rests
on multiple institutions performing the same function.8 Response
diversity refers to institutions having several different responses to
disturbances.9 Organizational buffering refers to the strategies used to
protect, insulate, or mitigate impacts on performance from the external
environment.10
Successful buffering enables organizations to achieve policy objectives
even as they interact with turbulent institutional environments and
deal with uncertainty and instability.10
Redundancy and diversity enable adaptive capacity and are critical for
accommodating the functional dynamics of ecosystems.6
Strategies to effectively deal with political influences are critical to
achieving biodiversity outcomes.1 Buffering is thus critical to
understanding both political and functional institutional fit.
Power and authority
Power is exercised when actors pursue values, interests, and goals.11 
Authority bestows formal roles and responsibilities on individuals and
organizations.12 Protected area agencies are formally empowered to act
through statute, but authority can be obtained by other means.
Institutions can both empower and disempower actors, and
understanding power dynamics and the allocation of authority are
critical to understanding capacity and whether this capacity can be
used.13
Actors at higher governance levels and in the political and social
arenas also influence how authority is deployed, so power and
authority are critical for understanding the impact of the wider
institutional context on capacity.
1Clement et al. (2016), 2Ansell (2011), 3Head and Alford (2013), 4Rijke et al. (2012), 5Ebrahim (2005), 6Boyd and Folke (2011), Lockwood et al. (2011),
Koontz et al. (2015), 7Allen and Gunderson (2011), 8Chapin III et al. (2009), 9Elmqvist et al. (2003), 10O'Toole and Meier (2011), 11Gordon (2009),
12Hutchcroft (2001), 13Berman et al. (2012)
and trampling by feral horses, and fire (Lockwood et al. 2014).
Invasive species such as feral horses, and frequent, intense, and
large-scale wildfires are already significant ecological issues, with
warmer climatic conditions expected to exacerbate them
(Lockwood et al. 2014). Feral horses create both ecological
damage and social conflicts, thereby repeating longstanding
conflicts in the Alps over cattle grazing. While cattle grazing is
now banned in the high country, feral horse populations are high
and increasing rapidly, at an estimated 22% per annum (Mackey
and Porfirio 2015). Many Australians regard these romantically
named “brumbies” as part of the cultural fabric in the Alps (Crabb
2003). Public opposition to shooting has limited management to
less effective methods such as “brumby running,” where horses
are chased and roped by people on horseback.  
The extent and frequency of fires has increased markedly in the
Alps over the last decade, which has led to changes in policy that
are salient to this diagnosis. Major fire events in 2003 burned most
of the protected area landscape in the three Alps jurisdictions (see
e.g., Doogan 2006, Williams et al. 2006), followed by another
massive fire event in Victoria in 2009. Several major inquiries
followed these bushfires. In response to strong community and
political pressure to reduce fire risk, the Victorian government
adopted a hazard reduction burning target of 5% of all public
lands per annum, as recommended by a Royal Commission.
Despite evidence that it does not significantly reduce the risk to
human lives or assets unless directly around those assets (Gibbons
et al. 2012, Clode and Elgar 2014), the other jurisdictions followed
suit.
Diagnosis of current arrangements
Administrative competence
Accountability was the main feature of administrative
competence that was evident in the diagnosis. The effect of
narrowly defined accountability measures on the deployment of
skills and resources (general capacity), especially the rise in tied
funding in lieu of recurrent or baseline funding, was a prominent
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Fig. 2. Location of Australian Alps protected areas.
theme related to administrative competence of the various
government agencies and departments. The loss of specialists
from public agencies was also a concern for many respondents.  
A reduction in recurrent funding, especially funding for
discretionary activities, was a major concern for government
managers. Recurrent, discretionary funding has been replaced by
one- to three-year funding that is tied to completion of specific
tasks within planned initiatives. Many participants remarked on
how this affects adaptive capacity:  
Are the structures, strictures, and the rules flexible
enough to allow us to adapt in the way that the system
dictates?…the way we design our bureaucracy; the way
we design our budgets is we allocate something in the
order of 95%. Which seems to imply that year in, year
out we have 95% confidence we know how the system
operates. It’s nonsense. (Victorian government manager) 
Agency managers often “dressed up” ongoing projects in new
clothes to cope with this funding environment. While this tactic
ensures continuity for some projects, it does not address the pre-
allocation of funding to specific activities and a lack of resources
for experimentation, reflection, and learning. This affected not
just adaptive capacity, but managers thought it encouraged a
focus on those activities with quantifiable results in the short term,
which is especially out of step with often-slow responses of alpine
environments to management interventions. Uncertainty about
whether funding would be removed was also a capacity concern,
as a gap could lead to mistimed or absent management of critical
issues such as horses.  
Respondents frequently attributed the displacement of recurrent
discretionary funds by tied, initiative funds to broader shifts in
the public sector, where increases in accountability and efficiency
are pursued through increasingly strict institutional rules and
structures. Government respondents frequently discussed how
accountability and performance measures were narrowly
confined to spending and quantifiable outputs rather than
biodiversity outcomes:  
We only ever get slammed on accountability stuff because
it’s the only thing that they can easily measure. We never
get slammed for accountability in biodiversity because
it’s too hard to do. So they just come after the financial
stuff. (Federal government respondent) 
Respondent discussions of fire management were illustrative of
how this misplaced focus affects capacity. The post-fire inquests
and inquiries revealed a lack of trust in government agencies and
drove the implementation of rigid policies prescribed “from
above,” including inflexible hectare targets for hazard reduction
burning. While respondents understood the need to allocate
blame for the fires, tighter, more controlled policies were not
viewed as the answer to this complex problem, especially when
those policies undermined capacity to actually address the
problem. One Parks Victoria respondent articulated this
relationship between narrowly defined accountability and
competence more generally:  
It’s very much set up as a controlled environment rather
than an empowerment environment…I think if you’re
going to try to pursue a landscape scale approach, trust,
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consensus, partnership, complementarity are absolutely
sort of fundamental to that. And I think it’s hard to say
look, we’re going to have these highly controlled, driven
organizations held to high levels of what could be quite
narrow accountability and now we want you to operate
in this landscape context. 
This environment was linked to an increasingly “managerialist”
approach to governance. The rise of “professional bureaucrats”
was identified as part of a broader theme in which the public
service is increasingly trying to apply private sector practices. In
particular, a strong emphasis on customer-focused protected area
management was considered a hallmark of this mentality:  
Our push at the moment is all customer service, customer
service, customer relations…does everyone think you’re
really good? I think science as underpinning work is
disappearing, because it’s becoming—what’s the
community view? (NPWS respondent) 
This shifting organizational culture was thought to undermine
general capacity to effectively manage biodiversity, along with the
shrinking numbers of staff  with specific ecological expertise and
an increase in generalist staff. The sensitive alpine and subalpine
environments require specialist skills that are quite rare in
Australia. While some generalists had environmental
qualifications, higher level managers often had little relevant
expertise. For many respondents, this had a concrete impact on
their capacity to conserve biodiversity, as a matter of simple
arithmetic:  
By taking the generalist approach you have people that
have to do everything…And if you start allocating
percentages next to their time, the amount of time they
have dedicated to biodiversity management would be
10%, maybe 20%. (Parks Victoria respondent) 
Learning
Protected area management agencies in the Alps have made
concerted efforts to build capacity to rigorously monitor
management effectiveness. Despite these efforts, administrative
and cultural issues have made more systemic change difficult. On
an Alps-wide basis, the AACP was praised as a network for
fostering learning about on-ground management but had less
success in fostering political support or deeper forms of learning
that could lead to policy change.  
Across the three jurisdictions, there was evidence of learning at
the on-ground management level and within organizations but
less evidence that this was affecting higher level decisions. The
AACP provides a useful network for learning, especially for on-
ground staff  and midlevel managers. The AACP provides the
conditions to foster adaptive capacity as a useful space for trouble
shooting, sharing information, and learning from each other’s
experiences. While respondents able to provide examples of
learning that directly informed management, the failure of that
learning to have a more extensive impact on practice, community
perceptions, and policy was thought problematic. As one
researcher bluntly stated:  
Internally it works quite well. In practice though, I’m not
sure I can see anywhere where a decision has been changed
because of something that has come out of it. 
This was especially true of significant cross-border issues like
hazard reduction burning and feral horses. Respondents
frequently discussed how, despite accumulating scientific evidence
of negative ecological consequences for both, they had failed to
change policy or community perceptions. This failure to achieve
change outside of agencies and at higher levels within the
biodiversity governance regime was linked to poor capacity for
buffering.  
Although managers have improved their understanding of the
Alps and capacity to monitor, respondents noted that
institutional structures and practices hinder these efforts. For
example, while changes need to be obvious and immediate to
satisfy financial accountability measures, this is at odds with the
need to measure slower variables, reflect on results, and adjust
approaches. While accepting the necessity of such requirements,
the way these requirements are designed were thought to steer
agencies toward monitoring practices that measure outputs (e.g.,
number of hectares burned or horses removed) rather than
outcomes (e.g., vegetation condition). Funding practices in park
management agencies were another common source of
frustration, with impacts on capacity to learn, especially with
respect to making adjustments based on new knowledge or
changing circumstances:  
One of the hindrances to adaptive management is how
much flexibility there is to shift resources or shift
responses or actions based on what is learnt…And that’s
both in terms of, is there enough resilience in the resources
available to shift it quickly or shift it to different places?
But more importantly, who has the authority to make
that decision? And how simple is it for that authority to
be deployed? (Parks Victoria respondent) 
For many respondents, allocation of decision-making authority
to protected area managers was a major concern not just for
learning but also for the capacity to make management decisions
to effectively address threats to biodiversity. Some also discussed
how agencies were trying to develop more systematic approaches
to managing threats by linking them to priority assets, but that
the culture of “doing stuff” within the protected area agencies
would also need to change to support a more outcome-focused
approach to conservation. This focus on “doing stuff,” however,
stemmed from very practical considerations:  
It is that real dilemma about if you have $500,000 to deal
with a weed, do you spend $500,000 spraying it or do you
spend $250,000 spraying it and $250,000 measuring
effectiveness? And most staff would say we spend
$500,000 spraying it because we want to see results. But
then planners and programmers will say: but how do you
know you’re achieving anything? (Parks Victoria respondent) 
Buffering
Buffering both political and ecological drivers is critical to
effective biodiversity governance; however, the diagnostic
revealed poor performance in both areas. Inadequate capacity for
organizational buffering (Table 2) in protected area agencies has
led to misdirected and mistimed responses, which has created both
political and functional fit problems. The effect of different
approaches across borders had both positive and negative impacts
on capacity, which made significant cross-border drivers even
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more challenging but potentially offered benefits in terms of
redundancy and diversity.  
Government respondents often discussed the political nature of
protected area management, and how much time they spent
responding to political imperatives rather than following the
priorities prescribed in management plans. While many felt their
role as bureaucrats was to simply implement policy, this proved
difficult when policy requirements were unachievable. For
example, the 5% burning prescription was proving especially
difficult to implement practically and without compromising
biodiversity assets. Wildfires did not “count” toward the target,
and many respondents highlighted that the policy was failing in
terms of both risk reduction and biodiversity conservation:  
It’s really about risk reduction to communities, to keep
people safe, so [managers] want to be targeting the
highest risk areas, which the basic hectare target doesn’t
encourage. It actually encourages you to go to places that
are easy to burn, away from people. (Parks Victoria
respondent) 
Such isolated areas are often the most ecologically valued, and
many respondents were concerned about the consequences of
repeatedly burning large areas. Inappropriate timing was also a
concern, as higher targets were extending the length of the burning
programs into drier parts of the year, which increases the risk that
fires burn out of control. Both concerns highlight a functional
misfit. In addition to being an enormous drain on financial and
human resources, several respondents commented that the
combination of wildfire and broad-scale hazard reduction
burning was transferring the risk into the future and would
ultimately lead parts of the system to cross a threshold:  
We are putting in a fire regime in Victoria unlike anything
it has ever seen before in pre- or post-Aboriginal times
or pre- or post-European times…It is based on the
assumption, on the wrong assumption, that if you burn
an area you will reduce the fuel. It may be true in some
areas but it is not true in other ecosystems. It is absolutely
totally the reverse in many ecosystems. (Researcher
respondent) 
Despite many researchers and managers agreeing that the
ecological impacts of burning regimes (combined with intense
wildfires) were unprecedented, many felt governments had failed
to publicly communicate the risks and benefits of large-scale
hazard reduction burning in the Alps. It had become a simple
matter of arithmetic in the public sphere:  
Somehow in the community debate this very simple
equation of X number of thousand hectares being burnt
equates to you’ll be safe this summer. That’s where the
debate’s been hijacked by that very simplistic analogy
that if you see smoke in the air somehow you’re going to
be safe. (ACT Parks respondent) 
Addressing community perceptions, many respondents noted,
would be critical in driving the development of more sensible
policies, but some also noted the challenges of communicating
the complex (and still changing) ecological science to the broader
public. Some respondents made a link between capacity to
manage these big ecological problems and a lack of legitimacy
and trust among sectors of the community. A general anxiety
about the low level of public support was evident, and many
highlighted effective community engagement as critical to the
future of the parks. These issues were mirrored in feral horse
management, which was proving equally problematic in political
and public spheres. While most managers considered the technical
solution to be relatively straightforward and cost-effective (i.e.,
shooting from helicopters), and readily supported by scientific
evidence, the protected area agencies found the socio-political
dimensions of this problem a stronger influence on their capacity
to tackle such major issues.  
Most respondents felt this failure to address socio-political
conditions was particularly acute for feral horses. This issue
crosses borders and requires a coordinated approach, but two of
the three jurisdictions (Victoria and NSW) had failed to gain
public support for effective methods of control. While most
lamented the challenges of cooperative federalism and state
politics, some respondents felt this could present opportunities
for buffering through response diversity:  
You create a diversity of governance across that
landscape that have objective, foundation reasons for
action like legislation…you’ve got diversity in how you
deal with things. That gives you the resilience in the
system because it’s not just about one line management
group making the decision. It’s about the tension and
dynamics between the line management and its
community…so that creates resilience over time that can
resist political changes. (Parks Victoria respondent) 
Some respondents also noted the potential opportunities for
learning and innovation though analysis of different approaches.
In practice, however, the diversity of approaches was more often
driven by short-term political imperatives rather than intentional
effort to test and learn. Respondents recognized that the strategies
deployed in NSW and Victoria for feral horse control were not
effective, and were grateful that the ACT had adopted a bolder
approach. This had not, however, influenced management in the
other two jurisdictions, which have the largest populations of feral
horses. This tension was evident across a number of different
issues—i.e., cooperative federalism enables diversity, but it also
inhibits a coherent, consistent landscape-scale approach on
important cross-border drivers of biodiversity decline.
Power and authority
Power dynamics and the allocation of authority were themes
underpinning many of the aforementioned results. The influence
of politics and community and narrowly defined accountability
were less about capacity itself  and more about the ability to deploy
capacity (Table 2). Concerns regarding disempowerment of
public agencies and protected area managers were evident, as was
a resignation to a “restricted” authority for Alps managers.
Interviewees attributed this restriction to political control and
their confined role as policy implementers rather than expert
advisors or managers.  
Protected area agencies have the formal responsibility for
protecting the environment of the parks but have limited
discretion to act on this responsibility. While the AACP has
offered a place for managers to learn from each other, it was
perceived as failing to lead effective cross-border management of
issues such as fire and feral horses. In the main, respondents did
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not think this was due to a lack of knowledge or resources; rather
it was a problem of ongoing political intervention:  
My big picture view is that I think the AACP is a very
important entity that exists. I think it’s constrained in its
potential because of what I’ve just described [i.e., limited
power to address major threats like horses]. I think
there’s a need for a rethink along the lines of (1) letting
the managers manage without political intervention and
(2) with trust that they will achieve the right outcomes
because there are emerging issues that impact the
Australian Alps quite significantly, and that includes wild
horses. (Nongovernmental respondent) 
“Letting the managers manage,” however, would require greater
empowerment of public servants, which few respondents thought
possible.  
Juxtaposed against the theme of disempowerment is restricted
authority, with the roles and responsibilities imposed from higher
organizational and political levels in each jurisdiction heavily
driven by the politics and policies of the day. Though
jurisdictional differences and requirements were identified as a
barrier, respondents generally accepted this was the reality of land
management in Australia:  
The jurisdictions will always have different political
priorities for the Alps landscape…that’s reality. It’s a
political environment we live in and governments will
always have different policies and views on things; they
won’t always agree across a landscape like the Alps. 
(Parks Victoria respondent) 
There was also a resigned acceptance that the role of agency
managers, as public servants, is to implement government policy
rather than define it or influence it in a particular direction, even
if  they would like to do so:  
We can’t go along merrily. We might in our positions [in
the AACP] have arguments on how the park should be
managed or what’s the best thing for the park, but we
can’t go on doing that without implementing the
directions of the government of the day. (NPWS respondent) 
This resulted in fluctuating commitment to the AACP over
political cycles, and schisms related to contentious issues such as
alpine grazing, which periodically reappears on the political
agenda. Some respondents also noted the related problem of
resourcing the AACP and cross-border management when formal
authority—and thus accountability—rests with each jurisdiction.
Several respondents lamented the AACP’s lack of political
engagement, given its potential to lobby for additional funds. Yet
this was consistent with the way managers expressed their role in
protected area management as implementers of political
priorities, not advocates or even expert advisors:  
We’ve got to be pretty clear that irrespective of what our
views on different things might be ultimately the
government is the government. And if the government has
a governor that gets elected on a policy of “blah,” it’s our
role in life to work with the government on implementing
that policy, because that’s what they want. (Victorian
manager) 
Although acknowledging that politics is meant to be a reflection
of community views, respondents also noted that political
decisions are often driven by the views of low-membership special
interest groups such as those advocating against culling of feral
horses. More broadly, respondents were particularly concerned
about the politicization of protected area management and
environmental agencies. Instead of senior staff  providing “frank
and fearless” advice to politicians, many public servants felt
pressured to implement policies without question, even if  there
were negative effects for biodiversity:  
The relationship between the government, the public
service, the lobby groups…the barrier between those roles
often breaks down…And therefore you get senior public
servants who can be dismissed on the spot, not being
prepared to tell the government that their policy doesn’t
make sense when you look at the environment. (Parks
Victoria respondent) 
This again highlights both political and functional fit issues, where
the failure to deal with one (politics) affects capacity to effectively
address the other (functional dynamics of ecosystems).
DISCUSSION
Applying the institutional diagnostic has revealed limited
capacity to conserve biodiversity—and limited ability to deploy
this capacity—within protected area management agencies. This
is true of both adaptive and general capacity, and links to the
broader socio-political context in which these agencies operate.
Narrowly defined accountability inhibits learning and distracts
from the core mission of protected area management agencies.
While learning is occurring in protected area agencies and across
borders through the AACP, there has been less success in
translating this to policy change. Issues of disempowerment and
restricted authority have also been revealed through this
diagnosis. Problems with buffering and an ability to productively
deal with political and social influences were identified as
fundamental concerns in progressing adaptive governance.
Attention to buffering can assist in addressing the problems of
fit created by narrow accountability and restricted authority. For
the issues of fire and feral horse management, such attention
offers a way forward to enhance the performance of biodiversity
institutions in the Australian Alps. In the following discussion,
we return to the implications of this diagnosis for how institutions
enable or constrain capacity to conserve biodiversity in this
globally significant protected area and in other protected
landscapes with high biodiversity values.  
These results point to a critically important issue with the way
competence of protected area agency is measured, and
measurement drives the choices managers make. Australia, like
many other countries across the world, still draws heavily on the
principles of New Public Management, as evidenced by
respondent discussions of “managerialism” and its impact on
management. A legacy of reforms through the 1980s and 1990s,
managerialism sought to make public agencies behave more like
private organizations (Dixon et al. 1998). The idea was to improve
the performance of public agencies by shifting to a results
orientation and by incentivizing managers. On the surface, some
characteristics may seem similar to adaptive governance:
decentralization, providing discretion to managers, serving the
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public (as “customers”), quantitative measurement of indicators,
and monitoring and reporting measures (Bach and Bordogna
2011).  
Paradoxically, the effect on performance is often negative unless
the agencies are able to set undistorted (i.e., in that they align with
the agency’s objectives) goals where results are under agencies’
control (Speklé and Verbeeten 2014). These conditions do not
describe the situations facing protected area management
agencies. In the case of the Alps, agencies are steered toward
outputs such as number of hectares burnt because these are easily
measured and provide a form of performance accountability that
avoids more difficult and fundamental questions about whether
nature conservation outcomes are being achieved. While little
research has been done on how managerialism affects adaptive
capacity, Eakin et al. (2011) suggest it has a negative influence by
overly centralizing political power and impeding efforts to
manage complex and long-term problems. This case study
suggests that narrowly framed accountability measures could also
be a constraint on adaptive capacity.  
Accountability was a central theme emerging from this diagnosis,
with implications for capacity. While holding public agencies to
accountability standards is a core principle of good governance
of protected areas (Lockwood 2010), the Alps case study
demonstrates the problems with the promulgation of rules and
standards that achieve greater control but address only a narrow
set of criteria. Current systems strongly focus on hierarchical,
legal, and political accountability, thereby de-emphasizing other
forms of accountability, such as professional accountability,
which would focus on enabling protected area managers to meet
their conservation responsibilities (Rainey 2014). While protected
area managers thought they were being held accountable upward
(e.g., to politicians and higher levels of the public service), this
was not complemented by accountability downward (e.g., to the
broader community) and to their conservation objectives. This is
out of step with the need for expanded accountability measures
in protected area governance (Lockwood 2010, Armitage et al.
2012).  
Sometimes dubbed “accountability myopia,” it is also
shortsighted on two counts: (1) it privileges one kind of
accountability (i.e., upward) over accountability to communities
(i.e., downward) or to the mission of the organization, and (2) it
neglects long-term goals by focusing on short-term outputs and
efficiency criteria (Ebrahim 2005). In the Alps, there was also a
concrete impact on adaptive capacity, where a focus on financial
and output accountability means protected area agencies work
with fully allocated, tied funds. This not only prevents
experimentation and adjustments in an adaptive management
cycle but also leaves protected area agencies without financial
capacity to respond and adapt to issues as they arise. This
diagnosis underscores several functional misfits, where responses
are misdirected (e.g., burning areas that were already burned in
wildfires), mistimed (e.g., extending the burning season), or absent
(e.g., because tied funding is not renewed). While participants
knew this could drive some of the Alps system to cross ecological
thresholds, they felt constrained by institutional targets. This
illustrates how institutional conditions affect not just capacity but
the ability to use it.  
Learning is critical to both general and adaptive capacity (Table
2), and the diagnosis suggests it is the latter where there is poor
institutional fit. Successful learning at the operational level has
not translated to deeper policy change. The AACP was praised
as a useful network for learning, but it was more successful in
fostering instrumental learning, where management actions are
adapted to achieve conservation objectives (Dovers and Hussey
2013). While protected area agencies have learned a great deal
about how fire and feral horses could be better managed, learning
at the political and social level for these significant cross-border
management issues is still elusive. This has been a long-standing
issue with the AACP (Crabb and Dovers 2007).  
Both social and political learning are important for supporting
institutional change. While the former contributes to changes in
beliefs and preferences and reframing the policy problem, political
learning enables political actors to affect the agenda and
construction of policies (Dovers and Hussey 2013).
Accountability myopia may be to blame in part, as limited forms
of accountability tend to encourage routine error correction and
quality control but discourage more fundamental forms of
learning and innovation (Ebrahim 2005). This problem may also
be connected to the broader themes of disempowerment and poor
buffering capacity revealed in the diagnostic.  
The results in this study also illustrate how measures to constrain
discretion and disempower protected area management agencies
can constrain capacity by undermining performance and
reinforce underlying issues of public distrust of governments.
Protected area agency respondents were well aware of the need
to be responsive to public concerns but objected to the mechanism
through which this has occurred. By increasing political control
and associated reduction in managerial discretion, the capacity
of public agencies to deliver on their responsibilities has been
compromised (Ansell 2011).  
In what is sometimes called a “spiral of distrust” (Djelic and
Sahlin-Andersson 2008), constraining discretion can lead to poor
performance and can fuel a negative public view of government
agencies, which can lead to the implementation of even stricter
controls. In the Alps, protected area agencies shouldered the
blame for catastrophic bushfires, and are being asked to burn
more as a result. Despite increasing evidence that new blanket
burning prescriptions are ecologically unsound (Giljohann et al.
2015), and hazard reduction burning away from communities has
little effect on life and property (Penman et al. 2011), protected
area agencies are under pressure to burn and lack authority to
adapt burning prescriptions based on evidence. Problems of fit
here are, again, both political and functional.  
The results also provoke deeper questions about the role of the
public service. Many respondents in this study saw their roles
merely as bureaucrats executing public will or policy
implementers translating political directives with as little
discretion as possible (Vinzant and Crothers 1996). However,
managerial discretion is often necessary for solving local problems
and can facilitate interagency cooperation (Thomas 2003). While
the idea of “letting the managers manage” raised in this study is
consistent with the empowerment prescribed in the adaptive
governance literature, it is undermined by long-standing efforts
from political and higher level authorities to “make the managers
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manage” (Behn 2001). The results from this study suggest that
fostering adaptive capacity is not just about fostering certain
practices (e.g., self  reflection, monitoring, redundancy, diversity)
but is also about rethinking accountability and developing a more
substantive decision-making role for public agencies. The concept
of “accountable autonomy”(Fung 2004), where middle managers
have discretion to adopt and adapt evidence-based strategies that
align with outcome accountabilities set at higher levels, offers one
realistic pathway between the centralized, rule-based orientation
of present institutions and the flexible, decentralized orientation
of adaptive governance (Clement et al. 2015).  
The results of this diagnosis can be used to build capacity for
conserving biodiversity. Strategies to buffer external influences and
manage institutional interplay between, for example, hazard
reduction burning and biodiversity institutions could positively
influence capacity by empowering managers to take action despite
conflicting external pressures. This is an under-researched area in
public administration, but such buffering could include strategic
positioning, networking, defending (e.g., finding ways to maintain
capacity during times of financial pressure), and prospecting (e.g.,
searching for new ways the agencies can address political problems)
(Miles and Snow 1978, Meier et al. 2007, O’Toole and Meier 2011).
This is less about redesigning institutions and more about
managerial strategies to influence governance networks (e.g.,
through network structure, distributing information) and
exploiting opportunities present in the institutional environment
(O’Toole 2007, Herranz 2008). Management of institutional
interplay could also minimize goal conflict. Collaboration across
agencies and jurisdictions to identify synergies between the two
regimes or developing a shared overarching institutional
framework are two options (Oberthür and Stokke 2011). For fire
and biodiversity, this could mean a single policy that jointly
considers data on prescribed burning leverage, which essentially
considers the reduction in area burnt by wildfire achieved by one
unit of prescribed burning (Price et al. 2015) and ecological burning
regimes to develop more flexible hectare targets that match the
needs of specific ecosystems and conditions.  
While the adaptive governance literature often highlights the
benefit of diversity (Boyd and Folke 2011) and federalism (Koontz
et al. 2015) in providing adaptive capacity, these findings underline
tensions between diversity and cohesion that require more research.
Authority is restricted in a legal sense by jurisdictional boundaries,
which affects capacity to manage cross-border issues. While
respondents acknowledged the strength in diversity, this diversity
was more a political consequence than a useful management tool
or pathway to adaptation and learning. The location of authority
within each jurisdiction, and the lack of a formal authority to
receive funds, also meant the AACP suffers from crippling resource
constraints. One strategy to achieve unity could be to formalize the
AACP as a statutory authority (Clement et al. 2015). In addition
to shared decision-making, this could provide access to ecosystem
service funding (Scarlett and Boyd 2013). In the absence of such
reforms, developing buffering capacity could help mitigate the
negative effect jurisdictional diversity has on cohesive, effective
management of cross-border issues such as fire and feral horses.
Intelligently designed cross-border experiments might also leverage
this diversity for learning, and could help inform a broader
understanding of the effect of diversity on biodiversity outcomes.
CONCLUSION
This diagnosis of capacity to conserve biodiversity demonstrates
how the institutional environments of park management agencies
affect both adaptive and general capacity, especially with respect
to whether or not that capacity can be employed. Conflicts
between narrowly framed accountability measures, the political
environment, and the capacity of protected area agencies are
relevant to biodiversity governance in other protected areas,
especially those managed by public agencies. Such institutional
complexity is the norm for protected area governance, where
public agencies must not only fulfill conservation responsibilities
but also respond to and serve multiple actors and diverse values.  
Importantly, our results point to buffering strategies as a potential
way forward to deal with competing institutional logics. When
confronted by incompatible prescriptions from their institutional
environments, protected area agencies cannot just ignore one or
the other if  they want to achieve their conservation objectives.
Rather, the concept of institutional ambidexterity, where
organizations learn to excel at two contradictory things
simultaneously (Greenwood et al. 2011), offers guidance on how
buffering could not only help protected area agencies better deal
with these influences but blend both adaptive governance
practices with those required to cope with the “managerialist”
requirements of the public service. It is difficult to provide blanket
prescriptions for how to cultivate ambidexterity in protected area
management agencies since this depends largely on specific local
and national conditions, but it is possible to create “positive
hybrids” that blend both logics through improvised,
entrepreneurial responses to these competing pressures
(Jarzabkowski et al. 2013, Fossestøl et al. 2015).  
Although protected area agencies often deal with institutional
complexity in an opportunist and ad hoc manner, building their
capacity to buffer external influences offers an intentional way to
become more “ambidextrous.” In the Alps, one of the most
promising ways forward in this regard would be to leverage on
the existing AACP, which provides a network for dealing with
significant cross-border issues. Governance reforms focusing on
enhancing the authority of managers to deal with the major
threats to biodiversity attributes, while also leveraging on the
potential strength of cooperative federalism, could enhance
buffering capacity. Though the specific avenues for reform will
differ in other protected areas, similar institutional work to build
buffering capacity offers a practical way forward for protected
area agencies.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/8171
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